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CERTIORARI - REVIEW OF GovERNOR's D1sMISSAL PROCEEDING - Proceedings were instituted against the directors of a California prison on charges
of misconduct, incompetency, and neglect of duty, which resulted in their
removal from office by the governor. A constitutional provision authorized the
governor to appoint such directors, who were to hold, office for ten years, and
provided that the governor should have the power to remove the directors for
misconduct, incompetency, or neglect after an opportunity to be heard upon
written charges.1 Due notice and a complete hearing were accorded to the
directors as required. Plaintiff directors seek review of the removal proceedings
by writ of certiorari. Held, certiorari may issue to review proceedings by the
governor under a statute 2 providing for writ of review when an inferior
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction. O'Brien v. Olson, (Cal. App. 1941) 109 P. (2d) 8.
While courts are reluctant to interfere with a governor's findings of unfitness of a public officer as a basis for removing him, there is ample authority
for the use of the writ of certiorari for review when the governor is thereby
exercising a quasi-judicial function. 8 Statutory provisions for a writ of review,
such as the court was concerned with in the principal case, have repeatedly been
held to be but an affirmance of the common-law jurisdiction of the court in
certiorari.4 At common law, certiorari lies only to review judicial or quasijudicial acts, and it is peculiarly applicable to cases in which a judicial body, in
pronouncing judgment in statutory proceedings, exceeds its jurisdiction and no
appeal or writ of error is allowed. 5 But a mere statement of the rule in reference
to a governor's exercise of an administrative quasi-judicial power is not sufficient to solve the problems in the variety of situations that are presented. The
real difficulty is to determine when the governor is exercising a quasi-judicial
function. Furthermore, the doctrine of separation of powers has made it di£1 Cal. Const. ( I 8 79) art. X, § I : "There shall be a state board of prison directors,
to consist of five persons, to be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent
of the senate, who shall hold office for ten years. • • • The governor shall have the
power to remove either of the directors for misconduct, incompetency, or neglect of
duty, after an opportunity to be heard upon written charges."
2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937), § 1068: "A writ of review may be
granted by any court, except a municipal, police, or justice's court, when an inferior
tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction
of such tribunal, board, or officer, and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the
court, any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy."
8 State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, II6 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857 (1911);
Harrington v. Smith, II4 Kan. 262, 217 P. 270 (1923); In re Mason, 147 Minn.
383, 181 N. W. 570 (1920). Certiorari is the appropriate proceeding to review the
jurisdiction of a governor in a proceeding to remove a highway commissioner. State
ex rel. Olwn v. Welford, 65 N. D. 522, 260 N. W. 593 (1935).
4 See 25 CAL. L. REv. 694 (1937), and cases therein cited.
5 FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 181-182 (1926); People ex rel. Republican & Journal Co. v. Wiggins, 199 N. Y. 382, 92 N. E. 789 (1910); Greenville
Gas, Electric Light, Power & Fuel Co. v. Greenville, 165 Mich. 135, 130 N. W. 333
( 191 1). Writ of certiorari does not lie to review executive acts. Chase v. Billings, I 06
Vt. 149, 170 A. 903 (1934).
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ficult to justify the exercise of such a function by an administrative officer who
is not part of the judicial department. 6 Various definitions have been attempted,
and the majority of cases seem to indicate that a quasi-judicial function is not
exercised unless (I) it is carried on in a form and manner similar to a court
proceeding in that persons affected must be given notice and a hearing, and ( 2)
it involves the exercise of judgment in the determination of rights of persons or
property through the ascertainment of existing facts and the application to them
of principles and standards prescribed by law.7 Tested by these principles, it
would appear clear in the principal case that the prison directors, being appointed for a definite term and subject to removal only for express causes after
notice and hearing, cannot be removed by the governor at his arbitrary discretion without a review by the courts. 8 A governor should not be immune from
judicial control under all circumstances merely because he is chief executive of
the state, for it is apparent that in such case he might arbitrarily remove public
officers for political and personal reasons only. Indeed, the President of the
United States was confined to a quasi-judicial procedure by the Supreme Court
in an attempted arbitrary removal of a duly appointed member of the Federal
Trade Commission.0 However, when control over subordinates by a governor is
more legislative or executive in character than judicial, there can be no review
by a court over such removals.1 ° Courts have no power to interfere by certiorari
with dismissals made without cause by the governor where the appointment is
for a term at his will, pleasure, or discretion.11 Furthermore, it may be an
6 Brown, "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19 MINN. L.
REV. 261 (1935).
7 FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 180, 182 (1926); 25 CAL. L. REv.
694 at 695 (1937). For example, the power of the Real Estate Brokers' Board to
deny or revoke a broker's license is quasi-judicial, and hence reviewable by certiorari.
State ex rel. Progreso Development Co. v. Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers Board, 202
Wis. 155, 231 N. W. 628 (1930). But certiorari is not a proper remedy to review
the action of a general state-wide administrative board in suspending or revoking
licenses, because such boards do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 13 Cal. (2d) 75, 87 P.
(2d) 848 (1939).
8
14 C. J. S. 173 (1939); In re Mason, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N. W. 570
(1920); State ex rel. Olson v. Welford, 65 N. D. 522, 260 N. W. 593 (1935);
State ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47 N. D. 314, 182 N. W. 545 (1921).
0 " • • • the fixing of a definite term [for a public officer] subject to removal for
cause ••• is enough to establish the legislative intent that the term is not to be curtailed in the absence of such cause." Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S.
602 at 623, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935).
10 People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N. Y. 92, 77 N. E. 785 (1906);
Chase v. Billings, 106 Vt. 149, 170 A. 903 (1934). A more extreme view is that
found in Spivey v. Blackwood, 161 S. C. 521, 159 S. E. 927 (1931), where a governor's order declaring the office of sheriff vacant for misconduct was held to be executive in character, and not reviewable by certiorari.
11
See, for example, Touart v. State ex rel. Callaghan, 173 Ala. 453, 56 So. 21 I
(1911). But a governor does not have the power of removal where a statute creates an
office to be filled by appointment of the governor, and fixes the term, but confers
on the governor no power of removal. State ex rel. Lyon v. Rhame, 92 S. C. 455, 75
S. E. 881 (1912); Bruce v. Matlock, 86 Ark. 555, 111 S. W. 990 (1908).
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unconstitutional interference with the executive power of the governor for the
legislature to place quasi-judicial limitations on his power of dismissal of
executive subordinates.12 The ~eory of such an argument is that an executive
assistant is merely one of the units in the executive department, and hence subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the chief executive.
Any other view would lead to consequences of manifest inconvenience, and
would be an invasion of the executive branch of the government.18 A question
remains as to the scope of review under writ of certiorari. It is generally held
that a court may annul a finding of an inferior judicial officer or tribunal only
where there is no evidence to sustain a charge, or where there is an error
of law, or where errors going to the jurisdiction have been committed.14 It will
be seen that such a review will preserve a wide latitude within which a governor
may exercise his administrative discretion, since his decision on disputed questions of fact is conclusive, while at the same time it will afford the public
official judicial protection against an uninformed and arbitrary dismissal.
Kenneth J. Nordstrom

12 In Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926), it was held
that the President had power to remove a postmaster of the first class, without the
advice and consent of the Senate, as required by act of Congress. Such officer was
held to be subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief
Executive.
18 Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 33 S. Ct. 639 (1912); Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926).
14 State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, II6 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857 (19n);
Cohn v. Butterfield, 89 Neb. 849, 132 N. W. 400 (1911); FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL REMEDIES 180, 181 (1926).

